Abstract. We present a collision attack on the hash function HAS-160 reduced to 53-steps. The attack has a complexity of about 2 35 hash computations. The attack is based on the work of Cho et al. presented at ICISC 2006. In this article, we improve their attack complexity by a factor of about 2 20 using a slightly different strategy for message modification in the first 20 steps of the hash function.
Introduction
At ICISC 2006, Cho et al. presented a collision attack for HAS-160 reduced to 53 steps. Their attack has a complexity of about 2 55 53-step HAS-160 computations, which is barely feasible on an ordinary PC in practice. In this article, we show how to improve their attack by using a slightly different message modification technique to fulfill the conditions on the state variables in the first 20 steps of the hash function. With our method, we find a colliding message pair with a complexity of about 2 35 53-step HAS-160 computations. This improves the attack complexity of the original attack of Cho et al. by a factor of 2 20 , which makes the attack feasible in practice.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. A description of the hash function is given in Section 2. The collision attack of Cho et al. is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe the new improved collision attack. A sample colliding message pair is given in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Description of the HAS-160
HAS-160 is an iterative hash function that processes 512-bit input message blocks and produces a 160-bit hash value. The design of HAS-160 is similar to the design principles of MD5 and SHA-1. In the following, we briefly describe the hash function. It basically consists of two parts: message expansion and state update transformation. A detailed description of the HAS-160 hash function is given in [1] .
Message Expansion. The message expansion of HAS-160 is a permutation of 20 expanded message words w i in each round. The 20 expanded message words w i used in each round are constructed from the 16 input message words m i as follows. w0 ⊕ w1 ⊕ w2 ⊕ w3 w3 ⊕ w6 ⊕ w9 ⊕ w12 w12 ⊕ w5 ⊕ w14 ⊕ w7 w7 ⊕ w2 ⊕ w13 ⊕ w8 w17 w4 ⊕ w5 ⊕ w6 ⊕ w7 w15 ⊕ w2 ⊕ w5 ⊕ w8 w0 ⊕ w9 ⊕ w2 ⊕ w11 w3 ⊕ w14 ⊕ w9 ⊕ w4 w18 w8 ⊕ w9 ⊕ w10 ⊕ w11 w11 ⊕ w14 ⊕ w1 ⊕ w4 w4 ⊕ w13 ⊕ w6 ⊕ w15 w15 ⊕ w10 ⊕ w5 ⊕ w0 w19 w12 ⊕ w13 ⊕ w14 ⊕ w15 w7 ⊕ w10 ⊕ w13 ⊕ w0 w8 ⊕ w1 ⊕ w10 ⊕ w3 w11 ⊕ w6 ⊕ w1 ⊕ w12
For the ordering of the expanded message words w i the following permutation is used: State Update Transformation. The state update transformation of HAS-160 hash function starts from a (fixed) initial value IV of five 32-bit registers and updates them in 4 rounds of 20 steps each. Figure 1 shows one step of the state update transformation of the hash function. The function f is different in each round: f 0 is used in the first round, f 1 is used in round 2 and round 4, and f 2 is used in round 3. After the last step of the state update transformation, the initial value and the output values of the last step are combined, resulting in the final value of one iteration known as Davies-Meyer hash construction (feed forward). In detail, the feed forward is a word-wise modular addition of the IV and the output of the state update transformation. The result is the final hash value or the initial value for the next message block.
3 The Attack on 53-step HAS-160
In this section, we will briefly describe the attack of Cho et al. on 53-step HAS-160. A detailed description of the attack is given in [2] . For a good understanding of our results it is recommended to study it carefully. The attack is based on recent results in cryptanalysis of hash functions [3, 4] . It can be basically described as follows.
1. Find a characteristic for the hash function that holds with high probability after the first round of the hash function. 2. Find a characteristic (not necessary with high probability) for the first round of the hash function. 3. Use message modification techniques [3] to fulfill conditions for the characteristic in the first round. This increases the probability of the characteristic. 4. Use random trials to find values for the message bits such that the message follows the characteristic.
Characteristic for 53-step HAS-160
Finding a good characteristic is the most difficult part of the attack. In Table 1 , the characteristic which is used by Cho et al. in the collision attack on 53-step HAS-160 is given. Note that we use the same differential path for our improved collision-attack in Section 4.
Signed bit differences [3] are used to describe the differential path for 53-step HAS-160. To improve readability, only the differences in the expanded message words and state variable A for each step are given. Note that the differences of the state variables B, C, D, E are defined by the differences in state variable A. 
Set of Sufficient Conditions
In order to guarantee that the message follows the characteristic given in Table 1 , a set of conditions on the state variables have to be fulfilled. In Table 2 , the set of sufficient conditions for the first 25 steps of the hash function is given. Table 2 . A set of sufficient conditions on Ai for the differential path given in Table 1 , where 'a' denotes a condition Ai,j = Ai−1,j, 'b' denotes a condition Ai,j = Ai−1,j, 'c' denotes a condition Ai,j = Ai−1,j+7, 'd' denotes a condition Ai,j = Ai−1,j−10, 'e' denotes a condition Ai,j = Ai−1,j−17, and 'f ' denotes a condition Ai,j = Ai−1,j−17.
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Finding a Colliding Message Pair
In order to find a colliding message pair, we have to find a message, that fulfills all the conditions given in Table 2 . In total there are 434 conditions on the state variables. Therefore, the probability that a random message follows the characteristic can be estimated by 2 −434 . However, the probability can be improved by using message modification techniques. The main idea of message modification is to use the degrees of freedom one has in the choice of the message words to fulfill conditions on the state variables. This improves the probability of the characteristic. It is clear that the number of conditions that can not be fulfilled by message modification techniques determine the final attack complexity.
In is already fixed by the first step of the attack. Since there are 27 conditions on A 11 in step 11, we may fulfill them with a probability of 2 −27 . Hence, we have to repeat step 1 of the attack about 2 27 times to find message words satisfying all conditions in steps 1-11. Finishing this step of the attack has a complexity of about 2 27 · 11 step computations of HAS-160.
Use again basic message modification techniques to fulfill all conditions on
A 12 , A 13 , A 14 . This determines the message words m 8 , m 9 , m 10 . Since these message words can be chosen freely, this adds only small additional cost (3 step computations of HAS-160) to the attack complexity. 4. At step 15 and 16, the dependent words m 11 and m 4 ⊕ m 5 ⊕ m 6 ⊕ m 7 are already fixed by the previous steps of the attack. Since there are 27+27 = 54 conditions on A 15 and A 16 we may fulfill these conditions with a probability of 2 −54 . Since there are about 2 24 possible choices for m 8 , m 9 , m 10 in the third step of the attack (see Table 2 Since these values can be chosen freely, this adds only small additional cost (3 step computations of HAS-160) to the attack complexity. 6. After step 19, all the message words has been determined. Since there are still 18 conditions on A 20 , . . . , A 25 (see Table 2 ), we may satisfy the with probability of 2 −18 . Therefore, step 5 of the attack has to be repeated about 2 18 times to fulfill all the conditions in steps 20-25. This adds negligible cost to the final attack complexity.
With this method a collision can be found in 53-step HAS-160 with a complexity of about 2 55 53-step HAS-160 computations. For a detail of the description of the attack we refer to [2] .
Improved Collision Attack
In this section, we show how the attack complexity can be reduced to 2 35 . In the attack, we use the differential path of Cho et al. given in Section 3. To improve the attack complexity, we use a slightly modified strategy for message modification in the first 16 steps of the hash function. The main idea of our new method is to reduce the complexity of the collision search algorithm in steps 1-16. Therefore, we use the fact that an additional (first) message block can be used to generate an arbitrary IV (for the second block). This additional degree of freedom we use to reduce the complexity of the attack. The attack can be summarized as follows. Since there are 27 conditions at that step (see Table 2 ), we may satisfy all the conditions from step 7 up to step 16 with a probability of 2 −27 . Hence, we have to compute about 2 27 · 10 steps of HAS-160 to find message words that follow the characteristic from step 7 to 16. 3. Repeat step 2 of the attack about 2 7 times to get about 2 7 different values for m 8 ⊕ m 9 ⊕ m 10 ⊕ m 11 and save them in a list L. We will need these values in the next step of the attack. Finishing this step of the attack has a complexity of about 2 7 · 2 27 · 10 step computations of HAS-160. This is equivalent to about 2 31.6 53-step HAS-160 computations. 4. Use an arbitrary (first) message block to get a suitable IV (for the second block). Note that we have to calculate on average 2 IV s, since 1 condition on the IV has to be fulfilled to guarantee that the characteristic holds in the following steps. Calculate A 1 (for all values in L) and check if the 7 conditions on A 1 are satisfied. Since there are 7 conditions on A 1 , we always expect to meet the conditions after trying all 2 7 values in the list L. Once we have determined A 1 , this also determines m 0 , m 1 , m 2 , m 3 and m 12 ⊕ m 13 ⊕ m 14 ⊕ m 15 . Since m 0 ⊕ m 1 ⊕ m 2 ⊕ m 3 has already been fixed in the second step of the attack, this step of the attack succeeds with probability 2 −32 . Hence, we have to repeat this step of the attack about 2 32 times to find message words following the characteristic in steps 1-16. Finishing this step of the attack has a complexity of about 2 32 ·(2 7 +5+53·2) step computations of HAS-160. This is approximately 2 34.2 53-step HAS-160 computations.
5. Do steps 17 to 25 as described in the original attack (see Section 3). The complexity of these steps can be neglected for the final attack complexity.
Hence, we can find a colliding message pair for 53-step HAS-160 with a complexity of about 2 31.6 + 2 34.2 ≈ 2 35 53-step HAS-160 computations. Note that the complexity of the attack can be slightly improved by increasing the size of the list L. A colliding message pair for 53-step HAS-160 is given in the next section.
A Colliding Message for 53-step HAS-160
Applying our improved collision attack, we can construct a collision with a complexity of about 2 35 53-step HAS-160 computations. The colliding message pair is given in Table 3 . Note that h 0 is the initial value, h 1 is the intermediate hash value after the first block, and h 2 is the final hash value after the second block. ∆M1 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 h2 96D30020 DA815BDF DF265AB5 819CDE2E 5B887F3E h 2 96D30020 DA815BDF DF265AB5 819CDE2E 5B887F3E
Conclusion
In this article, we presented an improved collision attack on 53-step HAS-160 and an actual colliding message pair. Our new improved attack has a complexity of about 2 35 53-step HAS-160 computations. In the attack, we used a slightly modified strategy to do message modification in HAS-160. With this method, we can improve the previous attack by a factor of 2 20 , which makes the attack feasible in practice.
However, it still remains an topic of further research if the attack of Cho et al. on 53-step HAS-160 can be extended to the full HAS-160 hash function. This is work in progress.
